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Abstract
This study investigated the relationship between disposition (people’s consistent motivation) toward critical thinking (CT)
and worrying. In spite of its connection to psychopathology, worry is thought to represent an effort at problem-solving.
Moreover, worry has been found to be underpinned by cognitive development, leading us to predict a positive relationship
between worry and CT disposition. On the other hand, cognitive behavioral therapy, which involves techniques similar to
CT, has been shown to be effective in reducing worrying, suggesting that increasing CT disposition decreases worrying. This
study attempted to reconcile these seemingly contrasting predictions about the relationship between CT disposition and
worrying by using multiple mediator analysis. A model was proposed wherein the mediators, responsibility to continue
thinking and detached awareness of negative thinking, were related to two opposing predictions. The former is thought to
lead to enhanced worrying and the latter to reduced worrying, with both positively related to CT disposition. A
questionnaire study with university students (N= 760) revealed that CT disposition enhanced worrying by obliging people
to continue thinking about a problem, but that it also reduced worrying by enhancing the detached and objective
awareness of their negative thoughts. This study thus demonstrated the dual effects of CT disposition on worrying through
different mediators. Thus, when enhancing CT disposition, it is important for educators to be aware of possible
disadvantages apart from its worry-reducing effect. Future studies should therefore examine the underlying mechanisms of
these two effects of CT disposition.
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Introduction
Critical thinking (CT) is defined as purposeful, reasoned, and
goal-directed thinking [1]. During CT, people deliberately
monitor their thinking processes and are aware of possible flaws
in their reasoning (e.g., biases and premature conclusions).
According to the American Philosophical Association’s Delphi
Report, CT is a ‘‘liberating force in education and a powerful
resource in one’s personal and civic life’’ [2].
In order to promote CT, it is important to understand its
motivational aspects. It is widely acknowledged that CT is
composed of skills and dispositions [3]. ‘‘CT disposition’’ refers
to people’s consistent motivation to use CT in problem-solving [3],
their willingness and confidence in its use, and the degree to which
they enjoy it. The Delphi Research Project involved extensive
discussions among experts to identify the components of CT skills
and dispositions [2]. The Delphi Project stated that the disposition
of an individual inclined to use CT has the following character-
istics: 1) inquisitiveness with regard to a wide range of issues; 2)
open-mindedness regarding divergent world views; 3) systematic in
inquiry; 4) an analytical nature; 5) eagerness and courage to seek
knowledge; 6) confidence in one’s ability to reason; and 7) the
maturity to admit the existence of ill-structured or multi-faceted
problems [4]. The importance of disposition is further exemplified
by a study that found that although many medical educators
describe CT as an ability, these people’s descriptions of CT in
concrete scenarios actually reflected it as a dispositional factor
(e.g., lack of cognitive effort) [5].
Evidence is accumulating in support of a relationship between
CT disposition and the successful implementation of CT in
experimental tasks. These studies typically predict performance in
reasoning tasks by cognitive abilities (e.g., IQ) and cognitive styles
that overlap with CT disposition. Chan, Ho, and Ku found that
beliefs in certainty of knowledge predicted unsuccessful CT (e.g.,
appreciation of a counter-argument) beyond cognitive ability [6].
Macpherson and Stanovich also found that both cognitive ability
and CT disposition (e.g., actively open-minded thinking and need
for cognition) predicted successful CT (less-biased thinking) [7].
Kokis et al. found that CT disposition predicted performance in
reasoning tasks beyond cognitive abilities in children aged 10–13
[8]. In addition, previous research has indicated that CT
disposition has many other positive effects. For example, a self-
report measurement of CT disposition (the California Critical
Thinking Disposition Inventory; CCTDI) [3] predicted better
grade point averages (GPAs) in students [9]. CT disposition scores
were also correlated with lower library anxiety [10], lower general
anxiety, higher self-esteem [11], and flexible adaptability [4].
These findings indicate that CT disposition is related not only to
the use of CT and academic success, but also to indices of mental
health. Therefore, it is important to investigate the relationship
between CT disposition and clinically relevant variables in order
to not only maximize its benefits in clinical settings, but also
motivate the use of CT.
Worry is particularly important in this regard, not simply
because it is a representative indicator of psychopathology [12],
but because of the possible competing predictions about its
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relationship to CT disposition. Anxiety includes cognitive (e.g.,
worry), physiological (e.g., hyperarousal) and behavioral (e.g.,
avoidance) components [13]. The chain of negative and uncon-
trollable thoughts that constitutes worrying [14] is one of the
cognitive components of anxiety. Although worry is a part of
anxiety, studies have found that the former enhanced the latter
[12]. Prolonged worrying maintains affective and physiological
arousal in response to stress, and eventually leads to reduced
somatic health [15]. It is also related to various anxiety disorders,
indicating its clinical importance [12].
Borkovec et al. stated that worry ‘‘represents an attempt to
engage in mental problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is
uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative
outcomes’’ (p. 10) [14]. The definition of worrying that considers it
an attempt at problem-solving implies that CT disposition and
worrying are closely related, because both CT and problem-
solving are members of the closely related family of higher order
cognitions, together with decision making and creative thinking
[2]. Consistent with Borkovec’s notion that worry is related to
problem-solving, researchers have found correlations between
daily problem-solving and worry [16,17]. Worry uses working
memory resources [18], consistent with the notion that it is one of
the higher-order cognitive skills. In addition, cognitive develop-
ment (e.g., an understanding of multiple possibilities) was found to
mediate age-related increase in worry elaboration in children aged
3–7 [19]. Taken together, these findings suggest a positive
association between CT and worrying. Investigating possible
negative effects of CT disposition is important because it may
reveal clues as to why people do not engage in CT.
How can the positive link between worry and problem-solving
be explained? An etiological model of worry suggests that it begins
as an active attempt at problem-solving but becomes rigid and
inflexible [20,21]. A series of studies that used the Responsibility to
Continue Thinking (RESP) Scale to measure rigidity and
inflexibility supports this assertion [17,21]. RESP scores reflect
the belief that one is required to participate in prolonged and
persistent thinking about stressful problems (e.g., ‘‘I should
continue thinking until I find a better solution’’ and ‘‘It is
irresponsible to stop thinking’’). Although worry is associated with
many predictors [22], RESP score is one of the strongest [21].
RESP score and worrying were found to be related to the general
tendency to actively engage in problem-solving and not confined
to specific aspects of problem-solving (e.g., information-seeking or
solution generation) [17]. RESP score was also found to mediate
the relationship between self-reported active problem-solving and
worrying [17,23]. Therefore, it is possible that CT is not
exceptional among problem-solving approaches, and should be
positively correlated with RESP score (and, in turn, with
worrying). In other words, motivation and willingness to engage
in CT as represented by CT disposition can sometimes lead to
persistent thinking.
However, another line of research suggests the opposite
possibility: that CT disposition is negatively related to worrying,
consistent with the demonstrated relationship between CT
disposition and reduced anxiety [10,11]. Although anxiety and
worry are not entirely the same [13], as no previous study has
directly dealt with the relationship between critical thinking and
worrying, it is informative to examine the literature on the
relationship between CT disposition and anxiety for further
insight. An explanation for the anxiety-reducing effect of CT
comes from cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). CBT is currently
the most effective psychological intervention for various psycho-
logical disorders [24], including worrying [25], and assumes that
individuals with anxiety and depression tend to think negatively in
various situations. The goal of CBT is to modify such thinking
through cognitive modification skills, similar to CT (e.g., objective
awareness of one’s negative thinking pattern, analysis of evidence
for and against one’s conceptualization of a situation, and testing
the effect of an alternative way of thinking) [26].
The mechanism underlying CBT is thought to be similar to that
of CT. According to CT theory, exclusive reliance on one’s
habitual way of thinking (e.g., heuristics) can lead to errors; thus,
one would seek to enhance awareness of possible flaws in one’s
thinking [27]. The same is true for CBT. It has been found that
some people experience relatively automatic (frequent, uninten-
tional, difficult-to-control) negative thoughts about themselves
[28], and the habitual nature of such thoughts was predictive of
low self-esteem and anxiety, independent of the negativity of the
contents [29]. However, CBT does not introduce Pollyanna-like
thinking; rather, it promotes a detached awareness of negative
thinking [30]. Teasdale et al. found that CBT works by enhancing
detached awareness of one’s negative thinking (i.e., noticing that
negative thoughts are not facts, but are merely mental phenomena)
[31]. A self-report measure of detached awareness was found to be
negatively related to worry [32]. Therefore, detached awareness is
considered a potential mediator of the effects of CT on reduced
worry.
Indeed, when previous studies found that responsibility to
continue thinking mediated the positive relationship of problem-
solving to worry, negative relationships between problem-solving
and worrying also emerged, after controlling for the responsibility
to continue thinking [17,23]. Such negative relationships were not
evident in simple correlations. In these studies, confidence in
problem-solving mediated this negative relationship [17,23]; in the
present study, detached awareness is introduced as a potential
mediator.
Therefore, problem-solving can both increase and decrease
worrying. Consequently, CT disposition is expected to have a
double-sided effect on worrying, indicating the need for a model
that differentiates the positive and negative effects of CT. Based on
the above literature review, it was therefore hypothesized that CT
disposition can both enhance and reduce worrying, with each
effect mediated by different mediators. To summarize, constructs
include the following: 1) CT disposition, 2) responsibility to
continue thinking, 3) detached awareness, and 4) worrying. CT
disposition is expected to be positively related to both responsi-
bility to continue thinking and detached awareness. Each
relationship is derived from studies that related problem-solving
with worry and responsibility to continue thinking [17,23], or
studies of the mechanisms of CBT [30,31]. Further, as previous
studies have found, the responsibility to continue thinking will
enhance worry [17,21], but detached awareness will reduce it [32].
It may seem unusual to predict a positive relationship between CT
disposition and worrying when a negative relationship has already
been demonstrated between CT disposition and anxiety [10,11].
However, Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, and Tracy argued that
even when a simple correlation indicates the contrary, one might
continue to build a hypothesis that includes opposing mediating
effects [33]. Paulhus et al. based their discussion on the
demonstration of suppressor effects. Suppressor effects include
situations where a certain predictor behaves in a manner
inconsistent with its simple regression weight (or simple correla-
tion) to the target variable, for example, a situation when a
predictor with a simple positive correlation with the target
contributes to the prediction together with other correlated
predictors, resulting in a negative regression weight.
The following results successfully indicated two pathways
between CT disposition and worrying. In addition, a few
Critical Thinking and Worry
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supplementary analyses were also conducted: gender invariance of
the mediational model, the effects of CT disposition subscales on
worrying, and the possibility of an alternative mediational model.
Methods
Participants
Japanese college students (N=760) in multiple introductory
psychology classes (360 men and 400 women) with a mean age of
19.06 years (SD=2.91) were recruited and completed a question-
naire packet. Participants completed a paper-and-pencil question-
naire in groups in the classroom. As these classes were
introductory, many participants were first- (80%) or second-year
students (16%). Accordingly, 44% were age 18, 37% were 19, 11%
were 20; the remaining students were age 21–63. Data are
available from the author upon request.
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the institutional ethical review
board at Hiroshima University Graduate School of Integrated Arts
and Sciences (20-2). Before beginning, participants were explained
the nature and purpose of the study and were told that they were
free to refuse to participate in the research, at which point their
data would be discarded. Participants were asked to return filled
questionnaires only if they agree to take part in the study.
Therefore, the act of filling and returning questionnaires was
considered as consent. This procedure was adopted because the
questionnaires were analyzed anonymously. The research protocol
submitted to the IRB stated these anonymity procedures and was
approved without the explicit use of written consent.
Materials
Critical Thinking Disposition (CTD) scale [34]. The
CTD consists of 33 items that measure motivation for CT. Items
are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not true) to 5 (true). The
CTD was developed by using a pool of items containing multiple
self-report measures related to the disposition to use CT (a total of
96 items). Factor analysis with responses from 426 Japanese
college students identified four factors contributing to the use of
CT, namely, Awareness of logical thinking, Inquiry-mindedness,
Objectiveness, and Evidence-based judgment (Appendix S1). The
hierarchical factor structure with the second-order factor of CT
disposition over four sub-factors was supported by confirmatory
factor analysis. Therefore, the composite score of the four
subscales can be used as an overall index of CT disposition. As
the CTD was derived from a substantial pool of items, it can be
assumed that it encompasses sufficient content areas. In particular,
comparing the item contents of the CTD with the CCTDI [3], the
first published and most widely used scale of CT disposition,
reveals that the CTD is a valid measure. Although the CCTDI is
the most widely used measure of CT disposition, there has been
some concern over its validity in a Japanese population. Facione
et al. suggested there may be an increased risk of response bias
based on social desirability in Japan [3]. There is published
information on the validity of the CTD in Japan, however; thus, it
was deemed to be the most appropriate measure for this study.
The CTD has been correlated with other self-report measures (the
need for cognition, openness to experience, and empathy), thereby
demonstrating its construct validity. Furthermore, the Inquiry-
mindedness subscale predicted the use of CT during a critical
reading task (accepting evidence that counters one’s hypothesis)
among college students (N=85) [34].
Responsibility to continue thinking scale (RESP)
[17,21]. The RESP Scale was developed to measure the
metacognitive appraisals (how people evaluate and control their
own cognitions) that occur during problem-solving in stressful
situations. Participants were asked to rate how often they
experience the conditions described in each item on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (very frequent). The RESP contains
14 items, reflecting the extent to which one believes that prolonged
and persistent thinking about stressful problems is necessary.
Adequate reliability (internal consistency coefficients as .0.88)
and validity (e.g., correlations with perfectionism and active
problem-solving traits) have been reported for this scale [17]. It
has been shown that the RESP explains additional variance in the
degree of worrying beyond other known predictors [21], indicating
its incremental validity.
Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking Scale (REF)
[35,36]. Detached awareness is measured via the Refraining
from Catastrophic Thinking (REF) Scale. The REF is one of two
factorial-derived subscales of the Cognitive Control Scale (CCS)
[36]. The CCS is a face-valid measure consisting of items derived
from CBT techniques [26]. Participants were asked to rate the
extent to which they believed they could perform the actions
described in each item when they were anxious. The REF consists
of five items, with responses on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (I
absolutely cannot) to 4 (I definitely can), that measure the detached
awareness of negative thinking. Specifically, it measures the ability
to conceptualize thoughts as only mental events (and not reality),
and the ability to suspend further worrying (e.g., ‘‘Even if the bad
consequences of a problem come to mind, I can reassure myself
that they are nothing more than my imagination’’; ‘‘When I start
thinking about the situation seriously, I can stop for a while’’). A
series of studies have established the reliability and validity of the
REF [35,36], and it has acceptable internal consistency (a .0.71).
Furthermore, the REF was negatively correlated to indices of
negative emotions both cross-sectionally and longitudinally
[32,37]. Finally, REF scores were found to have improved after
a meditation-based program for outpatients with diverse mental
disorders [38] and nonclinical samples [39,40]. In addition,
Katsukura et al. found that increased REF scores were related to
symptom reduction, suggesting that the REF may be a mediator of
therapeutic change in such interventions [38].
The other subscale, Logical Analysis, reflects active and
objective problem-solving skills (e.g., ‘‘I can think of several
alternatives for how to think or act’’). Its contents are, therefore,
quite different from the REF and do not represent detached
awareness. In fact, the discriminant validity of the two CCS scales
has been indicated by confirmatory factor analysis [36] and by
differential relationships to other variables (e.g., logical analysis
was related to active-problem-solving, while refraining from
catastrophic thinking was related to reduced emotional distress)
[35]. Therefore, this subscale was not included in the present
study.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) [41]. The
PSWQ is a 16-item questionnaire with excellent psychometric
properties that measures the frequency and intensity of worry [42].
Items are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 5
(very true). The reliability and validity of the Japanese version of the
PSWQ [43] are comparable with the original version. The
reliability obtained in this study was also excellent (a=0.92).
Construct validity was demonstrated by a single factor structure
and positive correlations with anxiety (r= .72; p,.001; n=254)
and depression (r= .51; p,.001; n=227) in the student sample. In
addition, this scale demonstrated good discrimination from
obsessive symptoms (different factors were formed).
The PSWQ has been associated with cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological characteristics of worrying. (1) High scorers emitted
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more steps in a catastrophizing task in which participants are
asked to list their concerns to a consecutive chain of questions,
‘‘What is it that worries you about X?’’ where X is a worry topic or
an answer to a preceding question. They felt more responsible for
fully considering the problems than low scorers [44]. (2) High
scorers experienced greater anxiety, interfering thoughts, and
reduced performance in a cognitive task after false failure feedback
than low scorers [45]. (3) When both the PSWQ and dispositional
anxiety were high, people had difficulty in disengaging attention
from angry faces [46]. (4) High scorers showed slow heart rate
(HR) recovery after a stressful (unsolvable) cognitive task [47].
Similarly, high scoring women exhibited higher HRs during
various tasks [48]. Taken together, those who highly endorse the
PSWQ items indicate characteristic cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological responses.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and correlations were
computed by SPSS 21.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Mediation by
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness was
examined by multiple mediation analysis. Based on their
simulation studies, Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, and Russell
recommend bootstrap estimation of indirect effects as a desirable
way to test mediation [49]. The indirect effect is the product of
path coefficients before and after the mediators. Preacher and
Hayes designed a detailed procedure for bootstrap estimation of
the statistical significance of the indirect effect [50], while Hayes
provides an SPSS macro called ‘‘PROCESS’’ for this purpose
[51].
Invariance of the model between genders was examined via
multiple population analyses by structural equation modeling
carried out with AMOS 20.0. This procedure compares fit indices
between a model that specifies that its parameters are the same
across genders and the other with no such specification. If the
former indicated better fit, it can be concluded that model does not
differ across genders.
Statistical significance was set at p,.05 (two-tailed).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics and internal consistency
coefficients of the scales. Mean scores for each scale were
calculated by dividing the sum of the item scores by the number
of items. Thus, scores are on the same scale as the ratings (1–4 for
REF and 1–5 for all others). All scales evidenced similar scores to
those reported in previous studies, except for CT disposition, for
which the mean score was not reported in the original study.
All internal consistency coefficients (except for Evidence-based
judgment, a= .46) exceeded.72, indicating acceptable reliability;
five of the eight alpha coefficients obtained exceeded.85, indicating
excellent reliability. Although low a for Evidence-based judgment
is a concern, this is understandable because it has only three items.
In addition, our main analysis focused on total CT disposition
according to Hirayama and Kusumi [34], who supported the use
of total score based on confirmatory factor analysis (see Methods).
As post-hoc subscale-wise analyses were also conducted, however,
caution is recommended in interpreting the results involving this
subscale.
Although the age and grade (year in university) distribution was
highly skewed (skewness was 9.52 and 2.82, respectively), CT
disposition total and Awareness of logical thinking were correlated
with age (Spearman’s r= .14, p,.001, for both). Responsibility to
continue thinking was positively related to grade (Spearman’s
r= .11, p,.01). In addition, there were gender differences for three
out of four CT disposition subscales and detached awareness.
Awareness of logical thinking, Evidence-based judgment, and
detached awareness were higher for men, while Inquiry-minded-
ness was higher for women. Controlling for age and grade in the
subsequent analysis did not change the overall pattern of the
following results; therefore, age and grade were not included in
subsequent analyses. In addition, we examined gender invariance
of the mediational model.
Table 2 summarizes the correlations among study variables. CT
disposition was positively related to both potential mediators
(r= .24 to responsibility to continue thinking and r= .36 to
detached awareness; both p,.001) and negatively correlated with
worry (r=2.20; p,.001). In addition, responsibility to continue
thinking was positively related to worry (r = .47; p,.001), while
detached awareness was negatively related to worry (r=2.61;
p,.001).
Multiple Mediation Analysis
Standardized regression coefficients for the multiple mediation
model are depicted in Figure 1. All standardized regression
coefficients were statistically significant (p,.001), and the model
explained 51% of the variance of worrying. The statistical
significance of two indirect pathways from CT disposition to
worry was examined by bootstrapping estimation [50,51]. If the
95% confidence interval (CI) of an estimated effect does not
include zero, this effect is considered significant at the 5% level.
Indirect effects were significant for both responsibility to continue
thinking (B= .15; SE= .03; 95% CI= .10–.22) and refraining from
catastrophic thinking (B=2.27; SE= .03; 95% CI=2.34–2.21).
Mallinckrodt et al. also recommended the test of joint significance
as a statistical test for mediation, which requires a researcher to
indicate that each path is significant [49]. As indicated by the
statistical significance of all paths, the results also satisfied the latter
criteria. These results indicate that the effect of worry on CT
disposition was partially mediated by the two potential mediators,
with a significant direct effect as well.
Invariance of the Mediational Model across Genders
Gender difference in the mediational model was examined. In
addition to gender differences in the present data (Table 1), a
previous study also found gender differences in some facets of CT
disposition [52]. Multiple population analysis was conducted by
using AMOS 20.0 to compare models with/without the
constraints of invariance of parameters across genders. Specifical-
ly, four models with differing strengths of invariance were
compared: Model 1 has no invariance constraints; parameters
were free to differ between genders. In Model 2, regression weights
were set to be equal. Model 3 additionally required covariances to
be equal. The strongest, Model 4, further requires residuals to be
equal. Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Browne-Cudeck
criterion (BCC) are fit indices suitable for model comparison in
which smaller values indicate better fit [53]. AICs for Models 1–4
were 40.00, 40.77, 40.01, and 39.45, respectively; the correspond-
ing BCCs were 40.54, 41.17, 40.38, and 39.71, respectively.
Therefore, the strongest constraints of invariance (indicating that
the models are strictly the same across genders) yielded the best fit,
indicating that the mediational model did not differ across
genders. Indeed, root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) for Model 4 was.035, indicating close fit.
The Effects of CT Disposition Subscales on Worrying
Mediation analyses were repeated with CT disposition subscales
as independent variables. The same procedures as used in total
Critical Thinking and Worry
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score analysis were repeated for each subscale [51], while
controlling for the remaining three CT disposition subscales as
covariates. Table 3 presents a summary of these mediation results.
Indirect effects via responsibility to continue thinking were
significant (i.e., 95% CI did not include zero) for all four subscales,
while those via detached awareness were significant for three out
of the four subscales, except for Objectiveness. A direct effect of
CT disposition subscales on worrying was only significant for
Awareness of logical thinking. In addition, although the indirect
effect via responsibility to continue thinking was positive for total
CT disposition scores (Figure 1), that for Awareness of logical
thinking was negative. Similarly, while the indirect effect via
detached awareness was negative for total CT disposition scores
(Figure 1), that for Evidence-based judgment was positive.
Alternative Mediational Model
Finally, an alternative mediational model was also examined.
We examined the possibility that worry mediates the effects of
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness on CT
disposition. Clinical interventions thought to reduce responsibility
to continue thinking and/or enhance detached awareness were
found to reduce worry [30,54]. Therefore, the pathways from
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness to
worrying were not changed. Instead, we reversed the pathways
between this triad and CT disposition.
Figure 2 depicts the alternative model with standardized
regression coefficients (all were significant at p,.001). Both
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness had
direct effects on worrying (bs = .37 and2.53, respectively) and CT
disposition (bs = .39 and.31, respectively); while worrying nega-
tively predicted CT disposition (b=2.19). Indirect effects on CT
disposition through worry were significant for both responsibility
to continue thinking (B=2.05; SE= .01; 95% CI=2.08–2.02)
and detached awareness (B= .10; SE= . 02; 95% CI= .05–.14).
As the original and alternative models cannot be distinguished
by model fitness, we examined the variance explained of the final
dependent variable. Although Kazdin stated that variance
explained per se did not indicate mediation [55], we still believe
that it provides clues as to the ordering of a given set of variables in
the path diagram. The direct effect of worry on CT disposition
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, Gender Differences, and Internal Consistencies of Study Variables (N= 760).
Mena Womenb Total
Gender
Difference a
M SD M SD M SD t
Critical Thinking Disposition 3.39 0.50 3.38 0.47 3.39 0.49 0.36 .90
Awareness of logical thinking 3.10 0.61 2.94 0.60 3.02 0.61 3.77*** .86
Inquiry-mindedness 3.63 0.70 3.83 0.64 3.74 0.68 24.07*** .85
Evidence-based judgment 3.57 0.73 3.37 0.67 3.47 0.71 3.97*** .46
Objectiveness 3.51 0.62 3.56 0.62 3.53 0.62 21.11 .75
Responsibility to Continue Thinking 3.23 0.70 3.16 0.71 3.19 0.71 1.53 .87
Detached Awarenessc 2.46 0.53 2.38 0.57 2.42 0.55 2.08* .72
Worryd 3.04 0.76 3.12 0.78 3.08 0.77 21.49 .92
*p,.05;
***p,.001.
an= 360.
bn=400.
cMeasured by the Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking Scale.
dMeasured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079714.t001
Table 2. Correlation Among Study Variables (N = 760).
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Critical Thinking Disposition .85*** .76*** .53*** .70*** .24*** .36*** 2.20***
2 Awareness of logical thinking 1.00 .42*** .40*** .45*** .08* .38*** 2.28***
3 Inquiry-mindedness 1.00 .23*** .38*** .24*** .25*** 2.12***
4 Evidence-based judgment 1.00 .38*** .27*** .06 .06
5 Objectiveness 1.00 .21*** .20*** 2.07
6 Responsibility to Continue Thinking 1.00 2.19*** .47***
7 Detached Awarenessa 1.00 2.61***
8 Worryb 1.00
*p,.05;
***p,.001.
aMeasured by the Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking Scale.
bMeasured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079714.t002
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(b=2.19) was small compared to other standardized regression
weights. Indeed, worry explained only a small unique variance of
CT disposition. When entered in the first step in the regression
predicting CT disposition, worry explained 4% of the variance,
while responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness
explained an additional 20% in the second step. Similarly, when
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness were
entered in the first step, it explained 22% of the variance of CT
disposition, while worry explained an additional 2% in the second
step. Furthermore, variance of CT disposition explained in the
alternative model (24%) was smaller than that of worrying in the
original model in Figure 1 (51%).
Discussion
CT disposition enhanced worrying by enhancing responsibility
to continue thinking, while reduced worrying by enhancing the
detached awareness of negative thoughts (Figure 1). CT disposition
also demonstrated a direct negative relationship to worry. These
relationships were consistent across genders. Second, CT dispo-
sition subscales differed in their relative contributions to the
positive/negative effects of CT disposition on worrying. Finally, an
alternative path model in which worry mediated the effect of
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness on CT
disposition was examined; this did not perform as well as the
original model in Figure 1.
One of the chief findings of this study was that CT disposition
enhanced worrying by promoting the responsibility to continue
thinking. The positive relationship between CT disposition and the
responsibility to continue thinking, and in turn to worrying, means
that we should be cautious of the negative concomitant efforts of
CT. Motivation to use CT, reflected in CT disposition, may lead
to a persistence conducive to worry. This finding is also consistent
with our everyday experience that deliberate thinking is quite
effortful. Furthermore, there is evidence that effortful cognitive
processing (e.g., a working memory task) is related to increased
heart rate [56,57] and reduced heart rate variability [57], the latter
being correlated with worrying [58]. In addition, Pomerantz,
Saxon, and Oishi found that goal investment and perceived effort
toward goals are related to worrying and positive emotions [59].
Although rigid and inflexible thinking, as represented by
responsibility to continue thinking, is not technically CT, such a
correlation indicates that people are likely to become perseverant
when they voluntarily adopt CT.
Although increasing awareness of the positive effects of CT may
motivate more people to engage in it, failure to raise awareness of
its accompanying distress may discourage the voluntary use of CT.
When facilitating CT, it is important to mention that people may
experience worry when engaging in it. One study found that
acknowledging the feelings associated with a task (informing
participants that their feelings are understandable and acceptable)
enhanced participants’ motivation to continue to engage in the
task [60].
Figure 1. Multiple mediational model predicting worrying by
CT disposition (N=760). The values with one-headed arrows are the
standardized regression coefficients (all p,.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079714.g001
Table 3. The Effect of Critical Thinking Disposition Subscales on Worrying, Mediated by Responsibility to Continue Thinking and
Detached Awareness.
Indirect effect via
Responsibility to Continue
Thinking
Indirect effect via Detached
Awareness Direct effect on worrying
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Critical Thinking Subscales PE SE LL UL PE SE LL UL PE SE UL LL
Awareness of logical thinking 2.006 .002 2.009 2.002 2.017 .002 2.021 2.013 2.013 .003 2.020 2.007
Inquiry-mindedness .009 .002 .006 .014 2.006 .002 2.010 2.002 2.006 .003 2.013 .001
Evidence-based judgment .035 .006 .024 .048 .022 .007 .010 .036 .016 .011 2.005 .037
Objectiveness .007 .003 .001 .013 2.004 .004 2.011 .003 .002 .005 2.008 .013
Note: CI = bias-corrected confidence interval; PE =point estimate; LL= lower limit; UL=upper limit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079714.t003
Figure 2. An alternative mediational model predicting CT
disposition by responsibility to continue thinking and de-
tached awareness, mediated by worry (N=760). The values with
one-headed arrows are the standardized regression coefficients. The
value on the two-headed arrow is a correlation coefficient (all p,.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079714.g002
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One encouraging finding is that CT disposition itself had anti-
worry effects. Previous studies found that when responsibility to
continue thinking was controlled for, a negative pathway from
problem-solving to worrying emerged that was not evident in
simple correlations [17,23]. This study enhanced our understand-
ing by showing that this negative relationship was partially
mediated by detached awareness, suggesting that CT works
similarly to CBT in reducing worrying by decoupling negative
thoughts and later processing. Although the direct effect of CT
disposition on worrying was also significant, indirect effect through
detached awareness was 1.37 times larger than direct effect (95%
CI= .82 to 2.88). Recent evidence suggests that ‘‘decoupling’’ is an
effective strategy for maintaining motivation in the face of pain,
even without reduction in pain itself [61]. In a study conducted by
Pa´ez-Blarrina et al., electric shocks were given occasionally during
a task [61]. Participants were required to determine whether to
continue regardless of the pain or to quit so as to avoid the painful
shocks. Those who were told a story about people working with
pain in order to feed their families persisted longer than those who
were told about people who stopped studying because of pain.
Therefore, persistence was achieved not by reduced pain
(participants in both group experienced the same intensity of
pain), but by the disconnection of pain from subsequent behavior.
The results of this experiment suggest that people can be
motivated to use CT, even when it poses some distress (increased
worry). While this study revealed that CT disposition could reduce
worrying, whether and/or how CT can enhance the decoupling of
worrying and the discontinuation of CT are interesting questions
for future research.
Subscale-level mediation analyses provided clues for further
interpreting the double-sided effect of CT disposition on worrying.
First, a direct effect on worrying was observed only for one out of
four subscales, Awareness of logical thinking, again suggesting that
the effect of CT disposition was largely mediated by two
mediators. Second, the subscales differed from each other in their
relative contribution to CT disposition’s positive/negative rela-
tionship to worrying. Awareness of logical thinking reduced
worrying via both responsibility to continue thinking and detached
awareness. Therefore, this dimension was exclusively related to
reduced worry. As this subscale includes items reflecting
confidence in using CT (e.g., ‘‘I have confidence in thinking
accurately.’’), the result is consistent with a link between worry and
low problem-solving confidence [17,20,23]. Furthermore, the fact
that a direct effect on worry was found only for Awareness of
logical thinking implies that the direct negative effect of CT
disposition on worrying in Figure 1 may be largely driven by
confidence in using CT. Conversely, Evidence-based judgment
was positively related to worrying via both responsibility to
continue thinking and detached awareness, suggesting that this
dimension is exclusively related to increased worry. Thus, a strong
need for evidence may enhance worrying. This is consistent with a
study that indicated that worry is associated with elevated evidence
requirements [62]. However, replication is needed for the results
involving Evidence-based judgment because of its low internal
consistency. Finally, Inquiry-mindedness was positively related to
both responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness,
mirroring the double-sided effects observed with the total CT
disposition scores, but without a direct effect on worrying. Actively
open-minded thinking, a scale with items similar to Inquiry-
mindedness, was found to predict both more information-seeking
in decision making [63] and evaluation of arguments independent
of one’s prior beliefs [64]. Increased information-seeking may also
lead to persistence as reflected by the responsibility to continue
thinking, while thinking independent of prior beliefs may enhance
detached awareness of negative thoughts. Although more infor-
mation-seeking led to correct decisions in their experiment, Haran
et al. admitted that excess searches for information could be
counter-productive [63].
Examination of an alternative model suggested that the present
finding (that CT disposition had double-sided effects on worrying
partially mediated by the responsibility to continue thinking and
detached awareness) may be more plausible than worry mediating
the effect of these two variables on CT disposition, because in the
alternative model, the effect of worry (mediator) on CT disposition
(dependent variable) was not strong. In fact, responsibility to
continue thinking and detached awareness explained much more
of the variance of CT disposition than worrying. Furthermore,
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness
explained much more of the variance of worrying in the original
model (Figure 1) as well. In the original model (Figure 1), CT
disposition explained 4% of the variance when entered in the first
step in the regression predicting worry, while responsibility to
continue thinking and detached awareness explained an additional
47% in the second step. Similarly, when responsibility to continue
thinking and detached awareness were entered in the first step,
they explained 50% of the variance of worry, while CT disposition
explained an additional 1% in the second step. This suggests that
responsibility to continue thinking and detached awareness are
more suitable as mediators rather than independent variables.
Clinical interventions thought to reduce responsibility to continue
thinking and/or enhance detached awareness were found to
reduce worry [30,54]; thus, worry may not be an independent
variable. Therefore, worry may be better as a dependent variable
rather than as a mediator. In fact, the variance of worrying in
Figure 1 was explained to a larger degree than that of CT
disposition in Figure 2.
Finally, limitations and future directions should be discussed.
First, because indirect effects via worrying were statistically
significant, an alternative model cannot be rejected. Thus, future
longitudinal study will determine causality or elucidate the
reciprocal influences, if any. Second, it would be useful to examine
other variables that could explain the current relationships. The
actual execution of CT may determine its effect on the current
mediators or dependent variable. In addition, as noted in the
Introduction, Chan et al. found that belief in certainty of knowledge
predicted unsuccessful execution of CT beyond cognitive ability [6].
Indeed, worriers have been found to be intolerant of uncertainty
[65]. Finally, analogous to studies that predicted performance on
reasoning tasks by cognitive styles [7,8], future study might examine
the effect of CT disposition and two mediators on performance-
based tasks purported to engage characteristics of worrying, for
example, a catastrophizing task [44] or thought sampling while
focusing on breathing [66]. When researchers measure both the
frequency of worrying and the negative reaction to it during a given
period, a low correlation between them may index detached
awareness of negative thinking [67]. HR during or after stressful
cognitive tasks may also be used [47,48]. Cognitive-style studies also
included cognitive ability as one of the predictors [7,8]. In the
present context, executive function may be a candidate cognitive
ability to reduce worrying [68].
In conclusion, although CT disposition has many positive
effects, the multiple mediation analyses conducted in this study
revealed that the relationship between CT disposition and
worrying was mediated by two constructs: one through respon-
sibility to continue thinking and the other via detached awareness
of negative thinking. There was also a direct effect from CT
disposition, possibly driven by confidence in using CT. Although
the pathway via responsibility to continue thinking is consistent
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with our everyday experience of deliberate thinking as hard work,
this also suggests that we should be aware of this effect, lest it
discourage people from using CT. The other pathway, through
which CT disposition reduced worrying via detached awareness, is
promising, and further suggests that the decoupling of worrying
and the later use of CT is an interesting topic for future research.
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